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There is one human nature. Just as there is no difference in kind 
between prenatal, neonatal, adolescent, adult, and elderly human beings, 
there is likewise no difference in kind between black, white, Asian, or 
other ethnic groups of human beings. There is only one “race” of 
people—the human race. 
“To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is 
inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.”1 “Our 
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.”2 Government efforts to pigeonhole groups of people into racial 
boxes—what Chief Justice Roberts called a “sordid business,”3—is both 
                                                                                                             
 *  Jay Alan Sekulow is Chief Counsel of the American Center for Law and Justice 
(ACLJ), an organization dedicated to the defense of constitutional liberties secured by 
law. Walter M. Weber is Senior Counsel at the ACLJ. The ACLJ filed amicus briefs in 
the Fisher litigation in both the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. This article is 
drawn heavily from the most recent ACLJ amicus brief in Fisher. 
1 Parents Involved in Cmty Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
2 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
3 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, 
J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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ultimately incoherent (as people of mixed ethnicity illustrate) and the 
hallmark of racism (as with the Nazi efforts to define Jews and the 
segregationist efforts to define “colored” people). The use of racial 
labeling by the University of Texas (UT) is therefore incompatible with 
one of the basic premises of the Constitution: the inherent, equal dignity 
of all persons. 
I. GOVERNMENT MAY NOT ATTACH SIGNIFICANCE 
TO RACIAL LABELS. 
When the government forbids the differential treatment of 
individuals on the basis of racial labels, it properly sets itself against race 
discrimination. But when the government undertakes to treat people 
differentially on the basis of racial labels, it runs afoul of the norm of 
color-blindness that should be the touchstone of government action in 
light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In particular, a government’s use of racial classifications as 
qualifications for preferences or disabilities suffers from two glaring 
flaws: first, such labeling is ultimately incoherent, as racial categories are 
both arbitrary and porous; and second, such labeling, and the 
concomitant need to decide who fits into which racial “box,” associates 
the government with some of the worst historical pedigrees in human 
history. 
A. Racial Categories Are Arbitrary and Ultimately Incoherent 
The enforcement of any system of racial preference necessarily 
requires a determination of who counts as belonging to which race. 
“When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first 
define what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is 
nonwhite?”4 
In a world of completely segregated populations, it might be possible 
to maintain the fiction that there are intrinsically distinct, identifiable 
ethnic groups such as “black” and “white,” or “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” or 
“Asian” and “Hispanic.” But in a cosmopolitan world, such pretensions 
are exposed as utterly illusory. Countless children are born each day with 
a heritage drawing upon a host of varied ethnic and cultural backgrounds. 
Indeed, there are websites devoted to identifying and celebrating such 
                                                                                                             
4     Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (addressing the 
question whether a man of Japanese heritage is a “white person”). 
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“multiracial” children.5 And the number of “multiracial” children is 
growing.6 Hence, human beings cannot be pigeonholed into racial boxes, 
and it is offensive to insist that the government can—or must, as for 
purposes of state college admissions—do so. As the Supreme Court of 
California stated: 
If the [government rule assigning significance to racial 
categories] is to be applied generally to persons of mixed 
ancestry the question arises whether it is to be applied on 
the basis of the physical appearance of the individual or 
on the basis of a genealogical research as to his ancestry. 
If the physical appearance of the individual is to be the 
test, the [rule] would have to be applied on the basis of 
subjective impressions of various persons. Persons 
having the same parents and consequently the same 
hereditary background could be classified differently. On 
the other hand, if the application of the [rule] to persons 
of mixed ancestry is to be based on genealogical 
research, the question immediately arises what 
proportions of [the pertinent ethnic groups of] ancestors 
govern the applicability of the statute. Is it any trace of 
[the pertinent ethnic] ancestry, or is it some unspecified 
proportion of such ancestry that makes a person a 
[member of the pertinent ethnic group]?7 
For that matter, the very notion of discrete human “races” is, at best, 
highly questionable.  As the Supreme Court unanimously observed: 
                                                                                                             
5 E.g., THE DAILY MULTIRACIAL, www.dailymulitracial.com (listing and providing 
ethnic background information for prominent individuals of mixed ethnic heritage, 
including: Queen Noor,  Steve Jobs, Carol Channing, Bob Marley, Naomi Campbell, 
Bruce Lee, Salma Hayek, Booker T. Washington, Lolo Jones, Alexandre Dumas, 
Lani Guinier, Eddie Van Halen, Cher, Ben Kingsley, Jennifer Beals, Tiger Woods, 
Halle Berry, Tim Howard, Carly Simon, Barack Obama, Lena Horne, and Anthony 
Quinn); B L A C K F L I X . C O M ,  MULTIRACIAL CELEBRITIES, www.blackflix.com/articles
/multiracial.html (similar). 
6 Multiracial in America, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 11, 2015), www.pewsocialtr
ends.org/2015/06/11/multiracial-in-america/. (“Multiracial Americans are . . . growing at a 
rate three times as fast as the population as a whole”). 
7     Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 738, 198 P.2d 17, 28 (1948). See also Ozawa, 260 
U.S. at 197 (“Manifestly the test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual 
is impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among 
Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy 
brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or 
yellow races”). 
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There is a common popular understanding that there are 
three major human races—Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and 
Negroid. Many modern biologists and anthropologists, 
however, criticize racial classifications as arbitrary and 
of little use in understanding the variability of human 
beings. It is said that genetically homogeneous 
populations do not exist and traits are not discontinuous 
between populations; therefore, a population can only be 
described in terms of relative frequencies of various 
traits. Clear-cut categories do not exist. The particular 
traits which have generally been chosen to characterize 
races have been criticized as having little biological 
significance. It has been found that differences between 
individuals of the same race are often greater than the 
differences between the “average” individuals of 
different races. These observations and others have led 
some, but not all, scientists to conclude that racial 
classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather 
than biological, in nature.8 
As Judge Garza explained in the Fisher case, “The idea of dividing 
people along racial lines is artificial and antiquated. Human beings are 
not divisible biologically into any set number of races.”9 
To be sure, individuals can take great pride in asserting their own 
ethnic identities, whether Irish, African-American, Italian, Chinese, or 
what have you. But it is an entirely different matter for the government to 
attach consequences to such a label, whatever its source. 
It is no answer for the government to have individuals self-designate 
their race for purposes of government action.10 Even if the government 
defers completely to an individual’s unfettered self-description, the 
government is still conferring official significance upon a person’s status 
as, e.g., “black” or “Semitic.”11 And if the government exercises any 
                                                                                                             
8 St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (emphasis added) 
(citing extensive authorities). See also Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198 (“the conclusion that the 
words ‘white person’ mean a Caucasian is not to establish a sharp line of demarcation 
[ . . . ] but rather a zone of more or less debatable ground”). 
9 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 264 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., 
specially concurring) (footnote omitted). 
10 UT currently asks applicants to “select the racial category or categories with which 
you most closely identify.” Apply Texas, Sample Application, https://www.applytexas.or
g/adappc/html/preview16/frs_1.html. (offering five categories). 
11     See also Nancy Leong, Multiracial Identity and Affirmative Action, 12 Asian Pac. 
Am. L.J. 1, 24 (2007) [hereinafter “Leong”] (“Providing boxes to check compels 
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supervision over the racial designations, it raises the sorry prospect of 
state agents asserting, for example, that someone is “too white” to 
qualify for minority status (or vice-versa). This is not an unrealistic 
scenario, even in the modern world.12 Moreover, if the government 
attaches real-world consequences to a racial label, that creates an 
incentive for one to shade one’s self-description, if not outright lie.13 
B. The History of Government Racial Classification of 
Individuals Is Not One that Should Be Imitated. 
Governments have tried before to undertake the “sordid business” of 
“divvying us up by race,”14 and the results have not been pretty. 
1. Germany and Rwanda 
The ugliest examples are associated with genocide. In Germany in 
the early 20th Century, for example, the national regime composed 
detailed formulae for determining who would or would not be deemed 
Jewish. As Justice Stevens acidly observed, “If the National Government 
is to make a serious effort to define racial classes by criteria that can be 
administered objectively, it must study precedents such as the First 
                                                                                                             
applicants to identify themselves in a certain way if they wish to benefit from affirmative 
action and demands that they choose to associate themselves with other members of a 
certain group . . . .[T]he race question forces applicants to declare their allegiance to an 
underrepresented minority group, perhaps at the expense of other aspects of their racial 
identity, if they wish to gain a certain benefit”). 
12 E.g., Bob Pockrass, Pennsylvania driver sues NASCAR, claims he was excluded 
from diversity program for being ‘too Caucasian’, PENN LIVE BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://blog.pennlive.com/pasports/2012/04/nascar_driver_too_caucasian.html (driver of 
Puerto Rican and Spanish descent sues over exclusion from program for minorities); 
Mem. in Support of Deft. Access Mktg & Commc’n LLC’s Mot. for Sum. Judg. at 12 
n.7, Rodriguez v. NASCAR, No. 3:10-cv-00325 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2012) (“Plaintiff 
did not fit the purpose of the affirmative action program because he looked like a 
Caucasian male”). See also Michael Olesker, When ‘black’ apparently was not quite 
black enough, BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 3, 2002) (African-Lebanese plaintiff sues, alleging 
failure to be hired for “diversity” position at college because he was “not visibly 
black”). 
13 E.g., J e s s e  W a s h i n g t o n ,  Some Asians’ college strategy: Don’t check 
‘Asian’, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 3, 2011); see also Leong, supra note 11, at 22 
n.98 (“Anecdotal evidence supports the logical intuition that multiracial people 
identify strategically on applications,” and an admissions consultant website expressly 
advised applicants who are limited to checking one racial box to “‘check the box that 
indicates the most disadvantaged group’”); cf. Mark Hanrahan, Rachel Dolezal, 
Spokane NAACP President, Falsely Claimed To Be Black, Family Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES 
(June 12, 2015). 
14 League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, J., joined by Alito, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
96 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:91 
 
Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935 . . . .”15 
The horrific steps following this categorization led to the deaths of 
millions of Jews. In Rwanda, racial labeling immensely facilitated the 
genocidal massacre of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in 1994. 
Mandatory government identification cards listed bearers as belonging to 
supposedly distinct tribal groups, most notably either Hutu or Tutsi. 
“[T]he designation ‘Tutsi’ spelled a death sentence at any roadblock.”16 
2. United States 
The United States has had its own unhappy experiments with 
government conferral of significance upon racial labels. In particular, 
enforcement of racial segregation, miscegenation, and immigration laws 
required the government to attach legal significance to the question what 
racial “box” a person belonged to. 
In Morgan v. Virginia, this Court observed: “In states where 
separation of races is required . . . , a method of identification as white or 
colored must be employed.”17 Lower courts consequently had to wrestle 
with the ultimately arbitrary question, “Who exactly is white and who is 
nonwhite?”18 
The case of Wall v. Oyster, is illustrative.19 The Wall case involved 
the use of racial labels to determine admission to educational institutions. 
In the District of Columbia, the government maintained separate schools 
for “white” and “colored” children.20 A child named Isabel Wall began 
attending the “white” school, but the principal excluded her “shortly 
thereafter . . . on the ground that she was a ‘colored child,’” despite the 
fact that Isabel asserted “she is a white child in personal appearance, and 
is so treated and recognized by her neighbors and friends.” The trial 
court acknowledged that “‘[T]here was to be observed of the child no 
physical characteristic which afforded ocular evidence suggestive of 
aught but the Caucasian,’” but ruled that because “‘the child is of negro 
                                                                                                             
15 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
German law defining Jews by ancestry or by combination of ancestry and marriage or 
religious practice). 
16 Jim Fussell, Group Classification of National ID Cards as a Factor in Genocide and 
Ethnic Cleansing, Presentation to the Seminar Series of the Yale University Genocide 
Studies Program (Nov. 15, 2001), www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/removing-facilitatin
g-factors/IDcards/. 
17 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 382, 383, n.28 (1946) (listing as examples tests 
for “any ascertainable Negro blood” and “one-fourth or more Negro blood”). 
18 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment). 
19 Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D.C. 50 (1910). 
20 Id. at 53. 
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blood of one eighth to one sixteenth . . . her racial status is that of the 
negro [and s]he is, therefore, “colored,” according to the common 
meaning of the term . . . .’”21 
The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. That court observed that “the 
duty was necessarily devolved . . . upon the board of education to 
determine what children are white and what are colored whenever that 
question shall arise in a particular case.”22 The court noted the variety of 
approaches taken by the states: “In some States ‘colored persons’ are 
declared by the statute to be those having a certain proportion of negro 
blood in their veins,—in some instances one fourth; in some one eighth; 
in some one sixteenth; and in others any admixture.”23 Since Congress 
had provided no such mathematical definition, the appeals court believed 
itself “compelled to ascertain the popular meaning of the word 
‘colored.’”24 After reviewing the approach taken in several cases and 
consulting the dictionary, the court concluded that “the word ‘colored,’ 
as applied to persons or races, is commonly understood to mean persons 
wholly or in part of negro blood, or having any appreciable admixture 
thereof.”25 
The Wall court’s struggle with the delineation of racial categories 
was by no means unique. Other courts undertook similar challenges.26 
These official excursions into racial classification rightly strike the 
                                                                                                             
21 Id. at 50-52. 
22 Id. at 54. 
23 Id. at 56. 
24 Id. at 57. 
25 Id. at 58. 
26   E.g., Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 178 (holding a Japanese immigrant is not a “white person”); 
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding a “high caste Hindu 
of full Indian blood” is not a “white person”); State ex rel. Farmer v. Bd. of Sch. 
Comm’rs, 145 So. 575 (Ala. 1933) (upholding exclusion of creole children from “white” 
school and their relegation to “colored” school, and discussing similar precedents and 
policy of racial separation); Weaver v. State, 116 So. 893, 895 (Ala. Ct. App. 1928) 
(miscegenation prosecution) (“It was proper to prove that defendant’s grandfather had 
‘kinky hair.’ This is one of the determining characteristics of the negro. This also applies 
to the questions involving the nose and other features. It is proper in a case of this kind to 
prove the race of defendant by description of any or all the characteristics belonging to 
the negro race, and even a photograph has been held to be admissible”); State v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 16, 242 S.W. 545, 545 (Ark. 1922) (“it cannot be said there was no substantial 
evidence tending to show a trace of negro blood in the veins of said children”); State v. 
Treadway, 52 So. 500 (La. 1910) (miscegenation prosecution) (extensive treatment of 
distinction between “Negro” and “colored” to determine that an “octoroon” was not a 
“Negro”); Messina v. Ciaccio, 290 So. 2d 339 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (birth certificate 
designation of race) (discussion of imprecision of various racial terms). Cf. McLaughlin 
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 187, 198 n.6 (1964) (“At the trial one of the arresting officers 
was permitted, over objection, to state his conclusion as to the race of each appellant 
based on his observation of their physical appearance”). 
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modern mind as appallingly racist and insensitive to the fundamental 
humanity of all persons, regardless of skin color, features, or ancestry. 
“The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings 
or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of 
the land are involved.”27 
In the Fisher case, the University of Texas, a governmental entity, 
gives significance—and thus potentially dispositive significance—to a 
prospective student’s racial label.28 Indeed, the applicant’s race appears 
on the front page of the application.29 “[I]t is undisputed that race is a 
meaningful factor” in the admissions process.30 That the university 
professes a benign motive for this exercise does not change the fact that 
“the very attempt to define with precision a beneficiary’s qualifying 
racial characteristics is repugnant to our constitutional ideals.”31 “The 
worst forms of racial discrimination in this Nation have always been 
accompanied by straight-faced representations that discrimination helped 
minorities.”32 Regardless of whether the government itself makes the 
racial labeling determination or puts upon the individual the task of self-
labeling (with or without any government oversight to forestall 
manipulation of the system, see supra), it is the government that 
ultimately says the label matters. That is inconsistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
“The time cannot come too soon when no governmental decision 
will be based upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or 
origin.”33 Colleges and universities ought not to impose racial 
classifications upon applicants or students, or require such applicants or 
students to self-categorize. To do so, no matter how sincerely and 
benignly intentioned, is ultimately incoherent, associates the institution 
with some of the most repellant practices of history, and runs afoul of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
                                                                                                             
27 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
28 Ishop Dep. Tr.at 19, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, No. 1:08-cv-00263-
SS (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2008). 
29 Id. at 19; see APPLY TEXAS, Sample Application Form ,  https://www.apply
texas.org/adappc/html/preview16/frs_1.html. 
30 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013). 
31 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 534 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
32 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
33 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 516 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 
